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Abstract
Beginning in the 20th century, international law expanded beyond lawbetweennations to eventually embrace
the concept of human rights. However, until recently, human rights efforts were focused mostly on
individuals, their rights and the obligations of the state in question. Indigenous peoples, on the other hand,
have always articulated their collective rights and, to their credit, achieved notable success.
While there is no doubt that these achievements should be applauded, what is also of interest, and deserves
further study, are the ways in which human rights jurisprudence concerning Indigenous peoples’ collective
rights intermingle, cross-fertilize, and integrate. This dynamic relationship between the various sources of
Indigenous rights law has had a tremendous impact locally, changing how states interact with the Indigenous
peoples living within its borders.
The first aim of this article will be to explore the above-mentioned topics in detail with a particular eye on the
African human rights systems. Secondly, it will examine how they relate to theEndoroiscase that was recently
decided by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. I conclude with an investigation into
what this could mean for Indigenous peoples’ rights in the African context.
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Africa: From Endorois and Beyond 
After more than 25 years of negotiations, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2007. This was a landmark event for the Indigenous rights movement and produced 
noticeable change in the traditional international legal order because indigenous peoples, as a group, 
were finally recognized as holders of a catalogue of rights.  
One must ask: How did international human rights law evolve in order to recognize the collective 
rights of Indigenous peoples? Consider if you will, Emerich de Vattel, who in the 18th century 
defined international law as the “science of rights which exist between nations or states and of the 
obligations corresponding to these rights” (cited in Anaya, 2004, p. 6). With sovereignty of utmost 
importance, the rights of individuals remained solely the responsibility of the State. After the 
emergence of human rights, international law surpassed the above-mentioned confines, and 
individuals were considered the subjects of international law. Indigenous peoples, however, wanted 
to move even further beyond the narrowness of the individual–state dichotomy (Anaya, 2004). To 
unlock the potential beyond the formal human rights system and to expand global human rights 
norms to include collective rights, Indigenous peoples would have to take advantage of the fact that 
human rights discourse permits plurality (Viljoen, 2007). 
The first point of entry for Indigenous peoples into the international legal arena was through labour, 
when the International Labour Organization (ILO) addressed the exploitation of Indigenous 
peoples and their lands by colonial industries (Oguamanam, 2004). The 1957 ILO Convention No. 
107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries (ILO, 1957) became the first instrument to address the 
question of Indigenous rights in a comprehensive manner.  
However, Convention No. 107 was critiqued (Swepston, 1990; Yupsanis, 2010) for its state-centric 
leanings and resulted in the drafting of a more up-to-date legal instrument, ILO (1989)Convention 
169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which revised and 
improved the previous convention. Convention 169 recognized the right of Indigenous and tribal 
peoples to live and develop as distinct communities (Venne, 1990), elaborated on the provisions for 
land rights, and elevated participation rights as a key principle. Through participation rights, 
Indigenous peoples received additional means to exercise control over their own economic, social, 
and cultural development. 
The entry point for Indigenous peoples to raise their concerns at the United Nations came through 
investigations into racial discrimination, when the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities recommended that a separate study on Indigenous 
populations be conducted under the auspices of the Special Rapporteur Jose Martinez Cobo 
(Oguamanam, 2004). The landmark report (Cobo, 1983), as Chidi Oguamanam (2004) explained, 
“set the stage for entrenchment of the indigenous question on the international agenda” (p. 355). 
At the United Nations, “a number of the issues affecting indigenous peoples” began to be “addressed 
in the context of individual human rights regimes” (Wiessner, 2007, Historical context and legal 
context section, para. 2). The Human Rights Committee (HRC) in its interpretation of Article 27 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [ICCPR], 1976), which recognizes the rights of ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
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language” and that “culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples” (HRC, 1994, 
para. 2).  
Similar to the HRC, the supervisory body of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1976) understood that, in order to fulfill the right to enjoy and maintain 
one’s culture, Indigenous peoples must be able to participate in any decisions that would affect their 
collective right to lands and resources (Matiation & Boudreau, 2006; Ward, 2011). Moreover, the 
goal of the state should be to acquire consent prior to using lands, territories, and resources 
traditionally used and enjoyed by Indigenous communities (Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights [CESCR], 2001; CESCR, 2004). As stated in the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Committee’s General Comment No. 21 (1997): 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural values and rights associated with their ancestral lands and their 
relationship with nature should be regarded with respect and protected, in order to prevent 
the degradation of their particular way of life, including their means of subsistence, the loss 
of their natural resources and, ultimately, their cultural identity. States parties must therefore 
take measures to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, 
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources, and, where they have been 
otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, take steps to return 
these lands and territories. (para. 36) 
In General Recommendation No. 23, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD, 1997) called upon all states to “ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal 
rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their 
rights and interests are taken without their informed consent” (para. 3(d)). CERD then referred to 
informed consent again in the context of the rights of Indigenous peoples to own, develop, control, 
and use their communal lands, territories, and resources (CERD, 1997). 
At the regional level, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) have interpreted the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration, 1948) and the 
American Convention on Human Rights (Organization of American States, 1969) in ways that have 
been very beneficial for Indigenous peoples. Similar to the steps taken to get to the UNDRIP, the 
jurisprudence emanating from the Inter-American human rights system did not occur in a vacuum. 
The Inter-American Court and Commission engaged in evolutive interpretation, employing 
decisions from other courts, utilizing authoritative interpretations of human rights norms, while 
simultaneously understanding that “greater cultural and ideological homogeneity of a region permits 
agreement on a fuller list of human rights” (Neuman, 2008, p. 106). 
The above was in no way an authoritative overview of the evolution of Indigenous peoples’ rights. 
What it was trying to demonstrate is the variety of ways in which human rights norms concerning 
Indigenous peoples’ rights intermingle, cross-fertilize, and integrate. This dynamic relationship 
between the various sources of law has had a tremendous impact regionally and locally, changing 
how states interact with the Indigenous peoples living within their borders.  
One of the aims of this article will be to explore this dynamic relationship, paying particular attention 
to the African human rights system. The main reason for the focus on Africa is that its human rights 
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hesitant to even acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ rights, whether philosophically, politically or 
legally. Recently however, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights appears to be 
receptive to integrating the concerns of Indigenous peoples, and in the example of the Endorois 
decision one could notice the cross-fertilization of human rights norms. This deserves further study 
along with an investigation into what this could mean for Indigenous peoples’ rights in the African 
context in the future. 
Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Concept 
The concept of Indigenous peoples, and the catalogue of Indigenous peoples’ rights that followed, 
stemmed from numerous grassroots movements that were mainly focused on the Americas and 
Australasia. In these regions, there was a morally compelling claim made by “first peoples” who were 
dislocated from their traditional way of life through colonial conquest, mass murder, dispossession, 
and displacement (Viljoen, 2007). The earlier human rights instruments dealing with Indigenous 
and tribal peoples, such as the ILO Conventions, reflected the focus on historic continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonialism. When it came to Africa, however, the acceptance of Indigenous 
peoples or Indigenous communities became a contentious issue, with the main argument being that 
all Africans are indigenous to Africa and no particular group can claim Indigenous status (Bojosi & 
Wachira, 2006). 
Another reason why African governments have resisted recognizing Indigenous peoples is the 
uneasiness about the rights associated with such recognition, namely the right to self-determination. 
After achieving independence, African states pursued a policy of national unity, where the hegemony 
of the post-colonial state depended on silencing counter-hegemonic voices and drowning out 
distinctive cultures and identities (Viljoen, 2007). Questions arose over the strategic and conceptual 
applicability of the concept in Africa, privileging certain sections of the population and resulting in 
the undermining of the already fragile nation building that was underway (Viljoen, 2007). Many saw 
indigenousness as a global interpretation of a Western-originated concept that needed to be 
refocused if it was to be relevant for the African continent (Viljoen, 2007). 
The full extent of Africa’s concerns and resistance to Indigenous peoples’ rights became even clearer 
when the text of the UNDRIP reached the General Assembly, where Namibia, with the support of 
many African states, asked for the vote on the UNDRIP to be deferred in order to allow for more 
consideration of African concerns (Barume, 2009). As a group, African states and governments (the 
African Group) published seven of their concerns in a Draft Aide Memoire dated November 9, 2006 
(African Group, 2006). As stated in this communication, the African Group (2006):  
•  Wanted a definition of “indigenous” in order to determine who would be the rights 
holders;  
•  Objected to the right to self-determination because they were fearful it would cause 
threats to political stability and territorial integrity;  
•  Recognized that, by allowing for the right to political, social, and cultural institutions, 
the UNDRIP contradicted several constitutions that promote unified states;  
•  Feared that accepting the right to belong to an Indigenous community meant that 
people could change their nationalities freely, resulting in political instability; 
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Indigenous communities could veto national legislation;  
•  Felt that recognizing the rights of Indigenous peoples to the lands, territories, and 
natural resources they traditionally owned, occupied, or acquired was unworkable 
and in breach of states’ rights over land and natural resources;  
•  And, in relation to respecting treaties that have historically been made between 
Indigenous peoples and states, claimed that only treaties were exclusively a state 
matter. 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to fully elaborate on the lobbying and discussions that 
took place with the African Group prior to the adoption of UNDRIP in 2007 (Barume, 2009), it is 
important to note that the concept of Indigenous peoples’ rights would only finally find its home in 
the African human rights system with the establishment of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (Bojosi & 
Wachira, 2006). Prior to this working group, the concept of Indigenous peoples was not embraced 
by the African Commission, as is reflected in the earlier jurisprudence, an issue which will be 
addressed in more detail in the following section.  
By asking the experts to examine the concept of Indigenous peoples in Africa, the African 
Commission, whether knowingly or not, allowed for an African perspective on indigenousness, and 
one that would be used during human rights litigation at the regional level. Although keenly aware of 
the controversy surrounding the concept of Indigenous peoples in Africa, in the Report of the 
African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities 
(Report of the African Commission’s Working Group, 2005), the Working Group of Experts 
adopted a more flexible approach to the term indigenous, distancing it from aboriginality and instead 
focusing on the following characteristics: marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion from 
developmental processes; occupation and use of a specific territory; voluntary perpetuation of 
cultural distinctiveness; and, survival of their particular way of life dependent on access and rights to 
their traditional land and the natural resources thereon (Bojosi & Wachira, 2006). 
Following the release of the above-mentioned report, the African Commission, which has a 
promotional and protective mandate with regards to the human rights enshrined in the African 
Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights (1982), reaffirmed that Indigenous peoples’ rights do exist, 
are compatible with, and are relevant for, Africa and hence released their Advisory Opinion on the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“Advisory Opinion,” 2007). The 
“Advisory Opinion” (2007) concluded by saying: 
…The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recommends that African States 
should promote an African common position that will inform the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with the African perspective so as to 
consolidate the overall consensus achieved by the international community on the issue. 
(para. 44) 
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Pre-Endorois 
Brief Overview of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Lying at the core of the African human rights regime is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Charter, 1982), which was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1986 following 
ratification by a majority of member states of the Organisation of African Unity (Pentassuglia, 2010). 
Included in the African Charter is the classic catalogue of civil, political, social, economic, and 
cultural rights found in other human rights treaties, but the African Charter also enshrines a number 
of “peoples’ rights.”1 At the time of drafting, the concept of peoples’ rights was not seen as something 
new, as the ICCPR and the ICESCR also referred to peoples’ rights. However, the inclusion of this 
concept was meant to reflect African values and traditions and to address the real needs of Africans 
in their pursuit of development (Viljoen, 2007). Of course, there are numerous ways2 to understand 
the concept of “peoples” in the context of the African Charter, particularly in relation to Indigenous 
communities. This idea will be explored later on in this section. 
As set out in the African Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
African Commission) was established with a specific mandate to promote all rights contained within 
the African Charter and to ensure their protection. The promotional and protective functions of the 
Commission were achieved through examining states’ reports;3 receiving communications from 
individuals, NGOs, or state parties on alleged violations;4 and interpreting the Charter5 more 
generally (Pentassuglia, 2010). The African Commission continues to be the central institution 
enhancing human rights protection across Africa (Pentassuglia, 2010). 
Uniqueness of the African Charter, Reluctance of the African Commission 
Apart from the inclusion of the concept of peoples’ rights, one of the more unique attributes of the 
African human rights system is the explicit reference to external sources. The Charter effectively 
implores the African Commission to use international human rights instruments in order to assist in 
the interpretation of the norms enumerated therein (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). As Article 60 of 
the African Charter (1982) stated: 
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, 
particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United 
Nations and by African countries in the field of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as from 
the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United 
Nations of which the Parties to the present Charter are members. 
                                            
1 See African Charter, 1982, Articles 19-24. 
2 Frans Viljoen (2007), for example, enumerates three ways to understanding this term:  
  1. Essentially encompassing everyone. 
  2. Denoting a distinct minority group. 
  3. Denoting the inhabitants of a group under alien domination. (pp. 243-244) 
3 See African Charter, 1982, Article 62. 
4 See African Charter, 1982, Article 47, Article 55. 
5 See African Charter, 1982, Article 45(3). 
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The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the 
principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules 
expressly recognised by Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, African 
practices consistent with international norms on Human and Peoples’ Rights, customs 
generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognised by African States as well as 
legal precedents and doctrine. 
Although superfluous at first glance, in the sense that other regional and international human rights 
systems do not have similar provisions yet still use other sources as interpretive guides, the 
Commission has at its disposal, by including these provisions, a wide array of possible sources that 
could provide guidance (Viljoen, 2007). In practice, the Commission appears to view Articles 60 and 
61 as working together to include relevant international law principles that relate to the Charter and 
the issue under consideration (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). As the Commission itself stated in 
Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (2003): 
The combined effect of Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter enables the Commission to 
draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity and also to take into 
consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, other general or 
special international conventions, laying down rules recognized by Member States of the 
Organization of African Unity, general principles recognized by African States as well as legal 
precedents and doctrine. (“The Merits,” para. 5; see also Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010, p. 91) 
Unfortunately, the African Commission seemed to avoid reference to external sources in its first 
years, using them only to distinguish the African system from other human rights systems (Neuman, 
2011; Viljoen, 2007). According to Frans Viljoen (2007), “this initial neglect may in part have been a 
deliberate attempt not to alienate states and to establish the Commission as an African institution, 
but in part also reflected the initial absence of reasoned and well-researched findings” (p. 345). 
However, this reluctance to use external sources has changed markedly. Since 2001, the African 
Commission often refers to United Nations treaties, General Comments, Human Rights Committee 
jurisprudence, regional human rights instruments and decisions, and even references “soft” law 
(Viljoen, 2007). As will be explored in the sections below, Articles 60 and 61 have been used for the 
benefit of Indigenous peoples in Africa and will hopefully be used to develop even more progressive 
jurisprudence that will further Indigenous rights. 
“Peoples’ Rights” and the African Commission 
As mentioned above, the concept of peoples in the Charter is uncertain, and the relationship of this 
term to Indigenous peoples was mired in even more controversy because of the contested nature of 
indigenousness in Africa. However, prior to the Endorois decision, the African Commission had the 
opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the term peoples in two cases: Katangese Peoples' 
Congress v Zaire (Katangese Peoples' Congress v Zaire [Katangese Secession], 1995) and The 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria (The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria [Ogoni], 2001). 
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under Article 20(1) of the Charter and, therefore, the right to secede from Zaire. In deciding 
whether or not to recognize the right of Katanga to self-determination, the African Commission was 
asked, albeit implicitly, to present a definition of peoples (Viljoen, 2007). However, the African 
Commission refrained from elaborating on whether or not the Katangese “consist[ed] of one or 
more ethnic groups” (Katangese Secession, 1995, para. 3) and they did not feel obliged to do so as 
the African Commission believed that the Katangese should have exercised a “variant of self-
determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire” (Katangese 
Secession, 1995, para. 6). Importantly though, the African Commission appeared to accept that the 
right of peoples to self-determination could exist if there was concrete evidence of human rights 
violations or if groups were excluded from participating in government (Viljoen, 2007). 
The Ogoni case was concerned with the impact of oil development activities on the Ogoni people 
who live in the areas surrounding the Niger delta, where most of the oil production was taking place 
(Pentassuglia, 2011). The African Commission found that the Nigerian government, through the 
Nigerian military and the State oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, violated, 
inter alia, the Ogoni peoples’ rights found in Article 21 of the Charter, namely the right of the Ogoni 
people to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources (Ogoni, 2001; Pentassuglia, 2011). 
Interestingly, on a number of occasions, the African Commission construed violations of various 
rights as a combination of individual and collective rights. For example, the African Commission 
stated that the levels of pollution and environmental degradation have  
Made…living in the Ogoniland a nightmare. The survival of the Ogonis depended on their 
land and farms that were destroyed by the direct involvement of the Government. These and 
similar brutalities not only persecuted individuals in Ogoniland but also the whole of the 
Ogoni Community as a whole. They affected the life of the Ogoni Society as a whole. 
(Ogoni, 2001, para. 67) 
Similarly, the African Commission concluded that the right to adequate housing as implicitly 
protected in the African Charter, also encompasses the right to protection against forced evictions, 
which is a right to be enjoyed by the Ogonis as a collective right (Ogoni, 2001; Pentassuglia, 2011). 
Using this line of reasoning the African Commission concluded that the Nigerian government also 
violated the Ogonis individual and collective right to health, to property, to family health, and to a 
satisfactory environment favourable to development. 
Although the approach of the African Commission in the Ogoni case was progressive in relation to 
its previous decision in the Katangese Secession case, it was still cautious, particularly with regards to 
using external sources in determining the rights of Indigenous peoples (Pentassuglia, 2011). 
However, the African Commission would utilize a more expansive approach in the Endorois 
decision (The Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights Group International 
(on behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya [Endorois], 2010).   
7
Inman: Cross-Fertilization of Human Rights Norms and Indigenous Peoples
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2014The Endorois Decision 
Background 
After a 40 year struggle, the African Commission made a historical and landmark ruling that the 
eviction of the Endorois peoples, in order to create a wildlife reserve, violated their rights as 
Indigenous peoples to their customary lands to free, prior, and informed consent, to development, to 
culture, to religion, to health, and to natural resources (Adam, 2011). 
The Endorois are a distinct Kalenjin-speaking community and for centuries have been the traditional 
inhabitants of the Lake Bogoria area within the Rift Valley province in Kenya (Endorois, 2010; 
Morel, 2004). The community consists of approximately 400 families, or 60,000 people, practicing 
pastoralism from early days (Endorois, 2010; Morel, 2004). The Endorois’ traditional way of life has 
always consisted of allowing their animals to graze in the lowlands surrounding Lake Bogoria during 
the rainy season and retreating to the Mochongoi forest for the dry season (Endorois, 2010; Morel, 
2004). The green pastures around Lake Bogoria have been vital for the health of their livestock and 
the lake also remains important for religious and traditional practices of the Endorois community 
(Endorois, 2010; Morel, 2004). 
The Endorois community continued to hold, use, and enjoy this land until 1973 when, without prior 
consultation or consent, the land was declared a protected area (Endorois, 2010; Morel, 2004). In 
1986, the Endorois community was evicted from the fertile lowlands surrounding Lake Bogoria and 
displaced to semi-arid land, resulting in the death of a number of their animals and their falling into 
economic hardships previously unknown to them (Endorois, 2010; Morel, 2004). Moreover, access 
to Lake Bogoria for religious and cultural purposes was restricted and even met with intimidation 
(Endorois, 2010; Morel, 2004). 
In an effort to regain access to their lands, the Endorois community pursued various avenues of 
recourse through the domestic legal system but ultimately failed (Endorois, 2010; Morel, 2004). 
The Endorois community first launched their campaign by challenging the land and natural resource 
regime that was adopted, unchanged, from the British colonial powers (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). 
Under the colonial system, land that was occupied by recognized ethnic groups was considered 
“Native Land Areas” and, although controlled by the Native Lands Trust Board in London, was 
effectively governed under customary tenure (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). After independence, the 
title to the Native Land Areas was transferred to the local authorities where the County Councils 
were “obliged to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the local communities” (Shepherd & 
Sing’Oei, 2010, p. 61). Unfortunately, this form of land tenure system, in many instances, resulted in 
collusion between the central government and the local authorities to privatize or nationalize Native 
Land Areas with complete disregard for the local communities (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). 
As this was the case for the Endorois community, they submitted a complaint to the Kenyan High 
Court, challenging the legality of the forced evictions and the constitutionality of the denial of access 
to their grazing lands, and to their cultural and religious sites (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). The 
Kenya High Court dismissed the Endorois’ claim and stated very clearly that it “could not address 
the issue of a community’s collective right to property” nor did they believe that Kenyan law should 
afford “any special protection to a peoples’ land based on historical occupation and cultural rights” 
(Endorois, 2010, para. 12).  
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Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights Group International, filed an 
individual communication with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2003 
claiming that the Republic of Kenya violated their right to practice religion, their right to property, 
their right to culture, their right to free disposition of natural resources, and their right to 
development. 
Key Legal Arguments and the Importation of International Jurisprudence 
As mentioned above, Endorois has been hailed as a landmark decision for Indigenous peoples’ rights 
in Africa and adds to the catalogue of progressive jurisprudence dealing with Indigenous peoples’ 
rights to traditional lands, territories, resources, and culture. Since the Endorois decision is integral 
to developing an understanding of the integration, cross-fertilization, and dynamic relationship of 
human rights law, the following section will be dedicated to an in-depth study of the numerous 
instances of the “borrowing” from other regional and domestic sources that can be seen in the 
African Commission’s decision. 
Determining indigenousness. Prior to discussing the merits of the alleged violations put 
forward by the complainants, the first substantive aspect the African Commission had to analyze was 
the Endorois’ claim to indigenous identity (Murphy, 2012). From the outset, the African 
Commission noted that “the terms ‘peoples’ and ‘indigenous community’ arouse emotive debates” 
(Endorois, 2010, para. 148) and that “there is no universal and unambiguous definition of the 
concept[s]” (para. 147). However, in their first attempt to determine “indigenousness” in the 
African context, the African Commission took a very unique approach.  
First, the African Commission stressed the uniqueness of the Charter, which departs from the 
narrow formulation of existing human rights instruments and instead includes the three generations 
of rights: civil and political; economic, social and cultural; and group rights (Endorois, 2010). Using 
the term indigenous is not meant to create a special class of citizens but is linked to the notion of 
peoples. This, in turn, is closely related to collective rights, a concept that, because of the generous 
provisions in the Charter, can be used to address the historical and present day injustices and 
inequalities felt by sections of populations with nation-states (Endorois, 2010). By allowing for a 
section of a population to claim protection when their rights as a collective are being violated, as was 
done in the Ogoni case, the African Commission opened the door for Indigenous peoples to claim 
similar protection (Report of the African Commission’s Working Group, 2005). 
Second, since the Charter includes provisions for peoples to retain rights as peoples and peoples are 
analogous to collectives, and indigenous communities fall within this parameter, the African 
Commission set out to provide criteria that could be used for identifying Indigenous peoples. For 
this task, the African Commission referred to its Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities, which highlighted the following criteria and shared characteristics: 
occupation and use of a specific territory; the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness; self-
identification as a distinct collectivity; recognition by other groups; an experience of subjugation, 
marginalization, exclusion, or discrimination; and survival of their particular way of life, which was 
dependent on access and rights to their traditional land and the natural resources thereon (Endorois, 
2010).  
Moreover, in applying Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter, the African Commission also took note of 
the internationally recognized working definition proffered by United Nations Special Rapporteur 
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No. 169 (1991).7 
Third, in attempting to dispel Kenya’s argument that Endorois are not a distinct community but a 
mere Kalejin-speaking sub-group of the Tugen tribe, the African Commission turned to the concept 
of self-identification included in the above-mentioned definitions (Endorois, 2010). To do this, the 
African Commission relied heavily on a case from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Saramaka People v Suriname (2007). The Saramaka case dealt with one of six distinct Maroon 
groups living in Suriname, an Afro-descendent community whose ancestors were African slaves 
forcibly taken to Suriname during European colonization in the 17th century (Endorois, 2010). 
Although not fitting the narrow aboriginal, pre-Colombian concept of an Indigenous community, 
the Saramaka still claimed violations to their collective rights, most notably to property because, over 
time, the Saramaka developed an ancestral link to their land and their way of life depended heavily 
on the traditional use of their land (Endorois, 2010). In view of the evidence presented, the Inter-
American Court considered that the Saramaka people made up a tribal community because they 
were distinct from other sections of the population and they had a special relationship with their 
                                            
6 Cobo Report, 1986, defines “Indigenous peoples” as follows:  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with 
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories or parts of them. They 
form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and 
legal systems. (Article 2) 
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the 
present of one or more of the following factors: 
•  Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
•  Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
•  Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system, 
membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); 
•  Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of 
communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general, or 
normal language);  
•  Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; and 
•  Other relevant factors.  
7 ILO Convention No. 169 (1989) offers the following definition in Article 1: 
  1. This Convention applies to: 
  (a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is 
regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or 
regulations; 
  (b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of 
present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their 
own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
  2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply. 
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members of the Saramaka community not “occupy[ing] the same precise history, territory, or 
customs of the larger super-class of which they were a part” (Murphy, 2012, p. 177). 
Noting the similarities to the claims of the Saramaka people and the Endorois, along with the 
Endorois' strong linkages between history, traditions, land, and culture, fulfilling much of the criteria 
of the above-mentioned definitions, the African Commission determined that the Endorois 
community was an Indigenous community and thus able to benefit from the provisions of the 
Charter that protect collective rights (Endorois, 2010). In supplementing previous African 
Commission jurisprudence concerning collective rights, and the African Commission’s Working 
Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities interpretations, with international soft 
law sources and comparative jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court, the African Commission 
adopted an expansive definition of indigeneity, and one that will hopefully have lasting positive 
consequences (Murphy, 2012). 
Article 8: Right to religion. The Endorois community claimed that by expelling them from 
their land, Kenya violated Article 8 of the Charter, the right to the free practice of religion. In 
determining if the Endorois’ cultural practices constituted a religion under international law, the 
African Commission looked to its own case law (Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, 
1993) on the matter but also to the Human Rights Committee. In General Comment 22, where the 
HRC provides an authoritative interpretation of Article 188 of the ICCPR, the HRC stated: “The 
terms ‘belief’ and ‘religion’ are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to 
traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous 
to those of traditional religions” (HRC, 1993, para. 2). Consequently, the African Commission 
determined that there was a violation of Article 8 of the African Charter. 
Article 14: Right to property. Following this, the African Commission examined the Endorois 
claim that Kenya violated their property rights as stated in Article 14 of the Charter. In determining 
this claim, the African Commission relied heavily on its own jurisprudence, most notably the Ogoni 
case, but also jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court and the European Court of Human 
Rights (European Court). However, prior to delving into the more substantive questions of the 
alleged violation, the African Commission first attempted to determine what was a property right in 
accordance with African and international law and whether special measures were required to 
protect such rights (Endorois, 2010). 
The Endorois claimed that property rights had an autonomous meaning under international human 
rights law, which superseded national legal definitions (Endorois, 2010). The Complainants 
                                            
8 ICCPR (1976) Article 18: 
  1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
[…] 
  3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
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had failed in acknowledging communal property rights, instead relying upon “formal” title (Endorois, 
2010). The African Commission appeared to be in agreement as they stated: “…the first step in the 
protection of traditional African communities is the acknowledgement that the rights, interests and 
benefits of such communities in their traditional lands constitute ‘property’ under the Charter…” 
(Endorois, 2010, para. 187)  
To support their conclusion, the African Commission referred to Dogan and others v Turkey (2004). 
This case involved villagers who were forcibly evicted after being unable to produce registered titles 
to the land where they were living. However, the European Court ruled that the villagers, although 
unable to fulfill formal domestic requirements to prove land ownership, did have rights to property 
because such rights were born out of possession alone (Murphy, 2012). In Dogan and others v 
Turkey, the possession mentioned previously included houses the villagers constructed themselves 
on the lands of their ascendants; land of their fathers which they cultivated; and the money earned 
from stockbreeding and tree-felling, which was used for subsistence (Endorois, 2010). 
Following the reference to Dogan and others v Turkey (2004), the African Commission also made 
reference to the landmark case from the Inter-American Court, Mayagna (Sumo) AwasTingni v 
Nicaragua (AwasTingni, 2001). This judgment adopted an evolutionary interpretation of the right 
to property as defined in Article 21 of the American Convention,9 in its meaning autonomous of 
domestic law, recognizing Indigenous rights to communal property (AwasTingni, 2001). In its 
decision, the Inter-American Court acknowledged that Indigenous rights to property derived from 
their traditional use and occupancy patterns and did not depend on State recognition (AwasTingni, 
2001). The African Commission echoed these sentiments by citing Articles 2610 and 2711 of the 
UNDRIP (2007) and two other Inter-American Court decisions: Case of the Moiwana Community 
                                            
9 American Convention (Organization of American States, 1969), Article 21 states: 
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such 
use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of 
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law. 
10 UNDRIP (2007) Article 26: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories, and resources, which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied, or otherwise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop, and control the lands, territories, and 
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, 
as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories, and resources. Such 
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions, and land tenure systems 
of the Indigenous peoples concerned. 
11 UNDRIP (2007) Article 27: 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, 
independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ 
laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of 
indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to 
participate in this process. 
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(YakyAxa, 2002). 
The African Commission referred again to the Saramaka case, where Suriname failed to recognize 
that the Saramaka people could enjoy and exercise property rights as a community (Endorois, 2010). 
This failure resulted from the Saramaka people not qualifying as a juridical personality and thus 
being unable to seek judicial protections against violations of their property rights (Endorois, 2010). 
Without appropriate land titles, Suriname believed that its duty was to simply grant members of the 
Saramaka community the privilege to use the land but effective control of the territory was left to the 
State. Kenya argued along similar lines stating that de facto ownership belonged to them in the 
absence of a land title and thus it was legally permitted to restrict access. The Inter-American Court 
rejected the argument in Saramaka. Similarly, the African Commission believed that the lack of a 
domestic legal framework designed to recognize communal property rights for the Saramaka in 
Suriname was analogous to that of the Endorois people in Kenya and Kenya had the duty to establish 
mechanisms to give effect to such property rights recognized in the Charter and international law 
(Endorois, 2010). 
By denying ownership of land to the Endorois, by expropriating their land and by restricting their 
access, the African Commission decided that the property rights of the Endorois people had been 
encroached upon. Although encroachment itself is not a violation of Article 14 of the African 
Charter, there is a two-pronged test to determine when encroachment can be conducted: in the 
interest of public need and in accordance with appropriate laws (Endorois, 2010). In determining 
public interest, the African Commission stated that this test had a high threshold because it 
concerned the encroachment of Indigenous peoples’ ancestral lands (Endorois, 2010). To elaborate 
on this point the African Commission referred to the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, who drafted a report on 
Indigenous peoples in 2004. 
Limitations, if any, on this right of indigenous peoples to their natural resources must flow 
only from the most urgent and compelling interest of the State […] Few if any limitations 
on indigenous resource rights are appropriate, because the indigenous ownership of the 
resources is associated with the most important and fundamental of human rights: the rights 
to life, food, and shelter, the right to self-determination, and the right to exist as a people. 
(Daes, 2004, para. 48) 
Limitations on rights, the African Commission explained by referencing Handyside v United 
Kingdom (1976), must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. For this, the African 
Commission did not believe that unlawfully evicting the Endorois from their ancestral land, 
destroying their possessions, and denying their property rights, were proportionate to a public need 
served by the Game Reserve that was set up by Kenya (Endorois, 2010). Moreover, the African 
Commission noted that the right to property became illusory when they lost access to Lake Bogoria, 
with Kenya violating the very essence of the right itself (Endorois, 2010). 
In relation to the “in accordance with appropriate laws” test, the African Commission regarded 
consultation to be an important and related requirement. In attempting to expand upon consultation 
duties, the African Commission turned once again to Saramaka, which was a seminal case that 
helped to qualify the meaning of participatory rights while defining the right to consultation and 
where applicable the duty to obtain consent (Saramaka, 2007). Saramaka was the first time the Inter-
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traditionally used within their territory” (Saramaka, 2007, para. 121).  
The Saramaka decision was also significant because it clarified whether and to what extent the State 
could interfere with Indigenous property rights in the exploration and extraction of natural resources 
located on their territory. Beyond conventional factors, the Inter-American Court was specifically 
required to take into consideration whether any restriction “amounted to a denial of the concerned 
communities traditions and customs, in a way that endangered their very survival” (Saramaka, 2007, 
para. 128). For this, the court established three safeguards to identify whether any restriction would 
violate an Indigenous populations’ survival. First, the state must ensure the right of Indigenous 
communities to effective participation in conformity with their customs and tradition regarding 
development plans. Then, it must guarantee that the Indigenous community shares in the benefits of 
the development plan. Finally, an environmental assessment must be performed (Saramaka, 2007). 
Only when those factors are respected can the state legitimately curtail Indigenous peoples’ rights to 
property. The African Commission concluded that no elements of the three safeguards proposed in 
Saramaka were met and this was tantamount to a violation of Article 14 of the African Charter 
(Endorois, 2010). 
Article 17: Right to culture. Following the discussion on property, the African Commission 
looked into alleged violations of Article 17, where the Endorois claimed that their group’s cultural 
rights were denied as a result of their limited access to Lake Bogoria and by the damage caused by 
Kenya to their pastoralist way of life (Endorois, 2010). In this instance, the African Commission 
determined that: 
Article 17 of the Charter is of a dual dimension in both its individual and collective nature, 
protecting, on the one hand, individuals’ participation in the cultural life of their community 
and, on the other hand, obliging the state to promote and protect traditional values 
recognised by a community. It thus understands culture to mean that complex whole which 
includes a spiritual and physical association with one’s ancestral land, knowledge, belief, art, 
law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by humankind as a 
member of society - the sum total of the material and spiritual activities and products of a 
given social group that distinguish it from other similar groups. (Endorois, 2010, para.  241) 
In reaching this conclusion, the African Commission drew inspiration from the HRC, as is reflected 
in their interpretation of Article 2712 of the ICCPR, which stated:  
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the Committee 
observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That 
right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in 
reserves protected by law. The enjoyment of those rights may require positive legal measures 
of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority 
communities in decisions which affect them. (HRC, 1994, para. 7) 
                                            
12 ICCPR (1976) Article 27: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. 
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to protect the cultural rights of the Endorois people but that a burden is also placed on African States 
to preserve the cultural heritage essential to group identity (Endorois, 2010). Due to the non-
derogable nature of Kenya’s responsibility to protect Endorois culture, in planning the game reserve 
Kenya had the obligation to ensure community access, particularly since access posed no harm to the 
reserve itself or to Kenya’s economic incentive to develop it (Endorois, 2010; Murphy, 2012). 
Article 21: Right to resources. In determining if Kenya had violated the Endorois’ right to 
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources, the African Commission first made reference to 
earlier jurisprudence, namely Ogoni, where they decided that Indigenous communities have a 
general right to the natural resources contained within their traditional lands (Endorois, 2010). 
The African Commission again sought the views from the Inter-American Court through the 
Saramaka decision. In Saramaka, the Inter-American Court interpreted the property rights contained 
within the American Convention to mean that the state is precluded from interfering with the 
natural resources located on Indigenous land without first consulting with the Indigenous peoples 
and permitting them to benefit from the results of natural resource development (Murphy, 2012). 
The African Commission concurred with this interpretation and, as in Saramaka, concluded that 
Kenya could not institute resource development projects within Endorois territory if it affected the 
natural resources traditionally used by the Indigenous community and which were necessary for the 
survival of the members of that community (Endorois, 2010). 
Article 22: Right to development. In determining if there was a violation of Article 22, the 
African Commission stressed the connectedness of development with participation. To do this, the 
African Commission took note of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development 
(UNDRD, 1986), which stated that the right to development includes active, free, and meaningful 
participation in the development process (Endorois, 2010). In Saramaka, the Inter-American Court 
noted that effective participation required the state to consult with said Indigenous community 
ensuring that development plans within their territory were according to their traditions and 
customs (Endorois, 2010). 
For the African Commission, participation also refers to benefit sharing. Again reference was made 
to the Saramaka decision, where the Inter-American Court stated that benefit sharing is not only 
vital to the right to development but, by extension, serves as an indicator that states are complying 
with the communal property of Indigenous peoples (Endorois, 2010). 
In addition, in determining the merits of the alleged violation of Article 22 of the Charter, the African 
Commission also made reference to the concept of “free, prior and informed consent.” In exploring 
this concept, the African Commission took note of the Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States 
(2002) decision at the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, where the Western 
Shoshone community was not accurately informed, nor did they give consent, prior to the US 
pursuing agricultural developments on their land. The African Commission also made note of the 
observations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situations of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples that free, prior, and informed consent is essential for the protection 
of human rights of Indigenous peoples with regards to major development projects (Endorois, 
2010). Moreover, the African Commission referred to the Committee of the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, which observed that: 
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communities, the Committee observes that merely consulting these communities falls short 
of meeting the requirements set out in the Committee’s General Recommendation 2313 on 
the rights of indigenous peoples. The Committee therefore recommends that the prior 
informed consent of these communities be sought. (CERD Concluding Observations: 
Ecuador, 2003, para. 16) 
Finally, the African Commission noted that the goal of development should be empowerment and 
this was not the case for the Endorois community. Similarly, the African Commission highlighted 
the case of the YakyaAxa community, which was displaced for the purposes of development projects 
leading to extremely destitute conditions for members of this community (Endorois, 2010).  
Concluding Remarks: Going Beyond Endorois 
The Endorois decision was a landmark ruling for Indigenous peoples in Africa and worldwide. As 
Cynthia Morel, the co-counsel for the Endorois stated: 
                                            
13 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 1997) General Recommendation No. 23 
stated: 
1. In the practice of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in particular in the 
examination of reports of States parties under article 9 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the situation of indigenous peoples has always 
been a matter of close attention and concern. In this respect, the Committee has consistently 
affirmed that discrimination against indigenous peoples falls under the scope of the Convention and 
that all appropriate means must be taken to combat and eliminate such discrimination. 
[…] 
3. The Committee is conscious of the fact that in many regions of the world indigenous peoples have 
been, and are still being, discriminated against and deprived of their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and in particular that they have lost their land and resources to colonists, commercial 
companies and State enterprises. Consequently, the preservation of their culture and their historical 
identity has been and still is jeopardized. 
4. The Committee calls in particular upon States parties to: 
(a) Recognize and respect indigenous distinct culture, history, language and way of life as an 
enrichment of the State's cultural identity and to promote its preservation; 
(b) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples are free and equal in dignity and rights and 
free from any discrimination, in particular that based on indigenous origin or identity; 
(c) Provide indigenous peoples with conditions allowing for a sustainable economic and 
social development compatible with their cultural characteristics; 
(d) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective 
participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests 
are taken without their informed consent; 
(e) Ensure that indigenous communities can exercise their rights to practise and revitalize 
their cultural traditions and customs and to preserve and to practise their languages. 
5. The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize and protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources 
and, where they have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise 
inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and 
territories […]  
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indigenous peoples as active stakeholders rather than passive beneficiaries […] That 
recognition is a victory for all indigenous peoples across Africa whose existence was largely 
ignored - both in law and in fact - until today. The ruling spells the beginning of a brighter 
future. (Human Rights Watch, 2010) 
With the Endorois decision, the African Commission has also removed all doubts concerning the 
possibility of Indigenous peoples claiming, collectively, the right to property, natural resources, and 
development as protected under the African Charter. Although it is too early to draw conclusions on 
the impact of its jurisprudence, this decision is a major step forward for Indigenous peoples’ rights in 
Africa. Its focus on the collective rights of Indigenous peoples to consultation and participation, and 
its emphasis on the requirement of free, prior, and informed consent, strengthen the distinctive 
interests of Indigenous peoples in the development process of their countries. Given the increasing 
pressures on Indigenous lands and the threat development projects cause to their livelihoods, the 
recognition of those rights is paramount to the survival of Indigenous peoples. Together with the 
Inter-American Court, the African Commission has taken a favourable move to defend the interests 
of Indigenous peoples and to remediate their longstanding exclusion and marginalization from the 
development process of their States. Locally, however, it remains to be seen whether the work of the 
African Commission will lead to significant changes but a few positive outcomes can already be 
noted, while failings from the Endorois decision can be highlighted in order to provide 
recommendations for the future. 
Localizing Human Rights  
Traditionally, international human rights lawyers have focused on the universality of human rights, 
promoting a catalogue of rights that represents a shared understanding of all peoples, the 
prerequisites for a life of dignity. However, for human rights to be truly relevant for all, they need to 
be situation specific and to be localized (De Feyter, 2006). Localizing human rights requires that the 
human rights needs must first be formulated at the local level before global human rights norms can 
be interpreted and elaborated upon, thus creating human rights actions at the global, regional, and 
local level (De Feyter, 2006). The international human rights regime remains a work in progress that 
must be contextualized (De Feyter, 2006). In other words, what we are searching for is an inclusive 
universality, which takes place on two fronts: within societies, steps must be taken to make societies 
more receptive to human rights; and within the international human rights system, flexibility and 
transformation must be understood as the way in which global human rights norms accommodate 
specific human rights claims (Brems, 2001).  
Post-Endorois we have firsthand evidence of this concept of localizing human rights, and how it 
worked to address local needs. Pre-Endorois, the idea of property rights in Kenya was narrowly 
defined, influenced by the classic English common law, inherited through a colonialism definition. 
The Endorois community challenged this at the local level but was unsuccessful because there were 
no precedents in domestic law for the recognition of collective or communal property rights, nor 
were there any precedents in domestic law for the recognition of peoples’ land based on historical 
occupation and cultural rights. In taking into consideration recent developments on Indigenous 
rights at the global and regional levels, and then providing an interpretation based on an African 
perspective, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights challenged Kenya’s arguments 
and decided in favour of the Endorois community. 
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lasting impact in future cases. In the lengthy Kenyan constitutional review process, the perspectives 
of the African Commission, along with recent comparative and international decisions on 
Indigenous land rights, were integral in influencing negotiations (Mennen & Morel, 2012). These 
efforts culminated in the adoption of a new constitution in 2010, which included provisions 
expressly recognizing community land as equal to public and private land (Mennen & Morel, 2012). 
The antiquated land trust regime was eliminated and community land is now “vested directly in the 
communities for the protection of ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-
gatherer communities” (Mennen & Morel, 2012, p. 82).  
In keeping with the concept of localizing human rights, the ensuing question is: What can be done 
with the Endorois decision? Wilmien Wicomb and Henk Smith (2011) have noted that with the 
award of title in Endorois, the door is now open for customary communities to be seen as peoples 
and for customary land tenure to be seen as culture. 
With respect to customary communities as peoples, Wicomb and Smith (2011) explain that, based 
on the African Commission’s own analysis, many customary communities would be able to identify 
themselves as tribal peoples or Indigenous peoples. For example, the African Commission 
determined the Endorois’ indigeneity through their seasonal semi-nomadic occupation of areas 
surrounding Lake Bogoria. However, transhumant nomadism is just one of the characteristics of 
Indigenous and local customary communities which occupy communal land (Wicomb & Smith, 
2011).  
Furthermore, the African Commission noted that the term indigenous is used to address historical 
and present-day injustices and the term peoples is closely related to collective rights (Endorois, 
2010). By marginalizing customary law systems, and because domestic African courts have been 
unable to protect customary forms of tenure, the protection afforded to the Endorois community 
could be extended to all customary communities (Wicomb& Smith, 2011). 
With respect to customary land tenure as a cultural right, Wicomb and Smith (2011) explained that 
when communities exercise their tenure rights within a communal system, this is an articulation of 
their culture or an expression of the culture of the people. In other words, land is central to the 
culture and cultural survival of customary communities, similar to the argument put forward by the 
Endorois community before the African Commission. Protecting customary forms of tenure of 
communities is of utmost importance, especially now in Africa, where the issue of land grabbing is of 
grave concern (Smis, Cambou & Ngende, 2013). In recognizing communal ownership, one hopes 
that the bargaining position of customary communities will be strengthened, invoking the state’s 
duty to consult and the requirement of free, prior, and informed consent (Wicomb & Smith, 2011). 
Incorporating the UNDRIP 
While Endorois has been hailed as a landmark decision for Indigenous peoples in Africa, we must 
also recognize its failings in order to highlight areas for further progress. The decision appears to 
refrain from elaborating upon instruments that were specifically designed to promote the rights of 
Indigenous peoples (Pentassuglia, 2011). Instead, the African Commission opted for jurisprudential 
dialogue (Pentassuglia, 2011). The UNDRIP and ILO Convention No. 169 are both notably absent 
from the discussion concerning the merits of the Endorois’ claims. When references to the UNDRIP 
are used, they appear to reiterate general principles, or perhaps expectations, and remain unused as 
an interpretive tool (Pentassuglia, 2011). 
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Peoples’ Rights stems from the unique provision, notably Article 60, that is contained within the 
Charter (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). Furthermore, to the general extent that many of the 
principles contained with the UNDRIP represent nothing more than the codification of norms that 
have already been accepted by the domestics courts throughout Africa, Article 61 of the Charter 
could have easily been used to incorporate the UNDRIP into the Endorois decision (Shepherd & 
Sing’Oei, 2010). The African Commission has been willing to use the procedural mechanisms 
contained within the Charter to reference international instruments, stating: 
The African Commission is, therefore, more than willing to accept legal arguments with the 
support of appropriate and relevant international and regional human rights instruments, 
principles, norms, and standards taking into account the well recognized principle of 
universality which was established by the Vienna Declaration of Action of 1993 and which 
declares that “all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated” 
(Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, 2003, Article 48; see also Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010, p. 
93). 
Moreover, consider the above alongside the African Commission’s stated position on the UNDRIP: 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights welcomes the adoption of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the UN General Assembly on the 13th 
September 2007. This Declaration is a very important document for the promotion and 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights all over the world, including on the African 
continent. 
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is in line with the position and 
work of the African Commission on indigenous peoples’ rights as expressed in the various 
reports, resolutions and legal opinion on the subject matter. The African Commission is 
confident that the Declaration will become a very valuable tool and a point of reference for 
the African Commission’s efforts to ensure the promotion and protection of indigenous 
peoples’ rights on the African continent. (Advisory Opinion of the African Commission 
Communiqué on UNDRIP, 2007, Communique on the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples section, paras. 1-2) 
The UNDRIP provides the minimum standards for the survival, dignity, and well-being for 
Indigenous peoples worldwide and using this framework for understanding how the rights in the 
Charter are to be applied to the Indigenous communities in Africa would have been monumental, 
not only for the African continent but also for the jurisprudential development of the norms 
embodied in the UNDRIP (Shepherd & Sing’Oei, 2010). An opportunity was missed in the 
Endorois case but hopefully the African Commission will think of ways to incorporate the UNDRIP 
in the future, particularly since “the usefulness of Article 60 and 61 of the Charter depends on the 
creative imagination of the [African] Commission” (Nmehielle, 2001, p. 161). 
Lessons Learned 
Until recently, many African governments have been reluctant to recognize Indigenous peoples as 
beneficiaries of the numerous rights contained within the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. Government officials gave numerous justifications for their position, most notably expressing 
concerns that the fulfillment of the abovementioned rights for Indigenous peoples as a group could 
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perhaps even more troubling, many African officials even questioned the existence of Indigenous 
peoples within African borders, claiming that all Africans are Indigenous peoples. Fortunately, the 
engagement of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and its Working Group of 
Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, in the development of Indigenous peoples’ rights 
as a specific issue in African human rights law, contributed greatly in detangling the contested 
concept of Indigenous peoples on the African continent and helped to respond to the objections 
raised by the African Group of States prior to the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).  
With its Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (2005) and its Advisory Opinion on the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), the African Commission managed to provide an African 
perspective on the concept of Indigenous peoples and, perhaps even more significantly, developed 
more relevant criteria for determining indigenousness. By focusing on elements such as 
marginalization, exclusion, and self-identification, as opposed to the more controversial criterion to 
define who are considered Indigenous peoples in Africa, the African Commission and its Working 
Group of Experts bypassed the controversy of whether or not Indigenous peoples as a group is 
applicable in the African context. This position has also broadened the scope of application of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights beyond the colonial framework and is likely to have repercussion in other 
parts of the world where the existence of Indigenous peoples is not fully accepted. 
The contribution of the African Commission is not solely limited to offering an African perspective 
on Indigenous peoples or to convincingly arguing that the manner in which the rights of Indigenous 
peoples were framed in the UNDRIP did not represent a threat to African States. By developing a 
novel interpretation of the African Charter in recognizing that Indigenous groups are the rights 
holders of peoples’ rights protected by the African Charter, the African Commission breaks with 
earlier suggestions that precluded Indigenous peoples from enjoying the same human rights as other 
peoples. At the heart of the controversy was the denial of the right of Indigenous self-determination. 
Even though an explicit decision has not yet been pronounced, the African Commission has set aside 
most uncertainties concerning the application of self-determination to the situation of Indigenous 
peoples in the Ogoni case. While endorsing an interpretation of self-determination that no longer 
defines the right in term of secession and independent statehood, the African Commission has 
confirmed that the right can be exercised within state borders, thereby dismissing arguments that 
would limit Indigenous self-determination on the basis that its exercise represents a threat to the 
territorial integrity of states.  
In its landmark Endorois decision, the African Commission has also eliminated any doubts 
concerning the possibility of Indigenous peoples claiming the collective right to property, natural 
resources, and development as protected under the African Charter. Although it is too early to draw 
conclusions on the impact of its jurisprudence, this decision is a major step forward in favour of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights in Africa. By focusing on the collective rights of Indigenous peoples to 
consultation and participation, and its emphasis on the requirement of free, prior, and informed 
consent, the Endorois decision contributes to highlighting the distinctive interests Indigenous 
peoples have in the development process of their countries. Given the increasing pressures on 
Indigenous lands, and the threat development projects causes to their livelihoods, the recognition of 
those rights is paramount to the survival of Indigenous peoples. Together with the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court, the African Commission has taken a favourable move to defend the 
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from the development process of their states. Locally, however, it remains to be seen whether the 
work of the African Commission will lead to significant changes. 
The general purpose of this article was to examine the various ways in which human rights norms 
cross-fertilize, intermingle, and integrate in an attempt to address local needs. With regards to 
Indigenous peoples, the struggle for their recognition and rights has occurred on a variety of stages, 
while changing the traditional discourse in the international legal arena and forcing the human rights 
regime to step away from the individual-state dichotomy. The Endorois decision represents the 
pinnacle of the human rights cross-fertilization process and a call for human rights localization. 
Hopefully, in going beyond Endorois, even with its faults, one hopes to see a continuing evolution in 
the advancements of Indigenous peoples’ rights across Africa. 
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